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ROBERT L. MCKNIGHT, 
Defendant-Respondent 
Case No. 14724 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This litigation arises out of an automobile accident 
occurring on March 5, 1970 on U, S. Highway 91, Davis County, 
Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Jury trial was held on June 2 to June 4, 1976 inclusive, 
resulting in a verdict of No Cause for Action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant has recited facts based almost entirely on her 
own testimony and completely ignores the testimony of the Defend-
ant, as well as the Highway Patrol officer, who was an eye-witness 
to the accident. 
We therefore recite the facts. 
The Defendant had completed his shift at Hill Air Force 
Base at approximately midnight March 5, 1970, and was driving his 
car alone south to his home in Salt Lake City* Traffic was light 
and after rounding a curve in the highway, he noticed the tail-
lights of the Plaintiff's vehicle in the outside lane, some con-
siderable distance ahead. He also noticed that a car was stopped 
^ „ * - U ^ <r,~~.»- ~T 1 J ...til. - . - - -
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He noticed that he was gaining on the car ahead and therefore 
moved into the inside lane when he was approximately 8/10ths 
of a mile from where the stopped car was (T-62)a His speed was 
about 60 to 65, and the speed limit was 70 m.p.h. (T-62). 
When he was approximately 300 to 400 yards away he re-
cognized the stopped car as a Highway Patrol car, but its red 
flasher signals were not on. He continued on, overtaking the 
vehicle in the right lane, and when he was in a position, with 
the front of his car near the rear of the Plaintiff's vehicle 
(T-62), the Plaintiff's car suddenly swerved in front of him. 
There was no signal of any kind, either blinker or hand signal 
(T-62-63). 
The Defendant swerved to his left and applied brakes 
but the impact immediately occurred wherein the right front of 
the Defendant's vehicle struck the left rear of the Plaintiff's 
vehicle (T-63). 
Officer Spadevechia had previously been driving south on 
the highway when he saw 2 horses standing in the emergency lane 
(T-23). He stopped and backed up to them, putting on his rear 
flasher lights, but he did not turn on his overhead revolving red 
lights, as he did not want to "spook11 the horses (T-29). He stop-
ped approximately 3 to 5 feet south of the 2 horses (T-32). The 
horses remained standing in the emergency lane while he radioed 
for assistance (T-32). 
He had seen the lights of the Plaintiff's vehicle approach-
ing. The horses never got on either of the travel lanes (T-32). 
As he turned to face forward, he states that the Plaintiff's ve-
hicle made a turn to the inside lane, approximately where the 
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horses were (T-33) and immediately thereafter an accident occurred 
shortly ahead of the police vehicle. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
41-6-62 (a) IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS 
CASE. AND THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED IN-
STRUCTIONS BASED THEREON. 
There was absolutely no evidence, from any witness, that 
the Defendant was nfollowing,f the Plaintiff, by which term, of 
course, has reference to following cars, which are directly be-
hind cars ahead and in the same lane, in which situation the 
following car must keep a reasonable distance between the vehicles * 
Facts of the case at bar have to do with two vehicles, 
each in a different lane, with the rear vehicle overtaking and 
intending to pass the slower moving vehicle. 
The Statute certainly has nothing to do with a fact sit-
uation, as here, where the jury had overwhelming evidence that 
established that the Plaintiff, without a signal of any kind, 
suddenly swerved from her outside lane to the inside lane, 
directly into the path of the Defendant, whose car was so close, 
that an accident immediately happened. 
Fairbourn v. Lloyd (1968) 21 Ut.2d 62, 440 P.2d 257 dis-
cusses the above Statute in a factual situation where, in fact, the 
Defendant was following the Plaintiff's car, when a collision oc-
curred as a result of Defendant's failure to see the Plaintiff 
stop, due to slush on the windshield. 
Even in that case, the Supreme Court held it was a jury 
question as to whether Defendant was negligent, and a verdict for 
Defendant was upheld. 
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Appellant's Requested Instructions on the cited statute, 
therefore, were clearly erroneous as applying the law as it 
applies to entirely different facts than were present here. 
The Honorable Trial Court was clearly correct in its 
ruling denying the requests. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION 12 FULLY COVERED THE 
LANGUAGE OF 41-6-46 (1)0 
The Court's Instruction No. 12 to the jury advised them 
that it was the Defendant's duty (a) to keep a proper lookout; 
(b) to keep his vehicle under reasonably safe control; (c) to 
drive at such a speed as was reasonable and prudent under the cir-
cumstances; (d) to sound a horn if circumstances required it. 
Appellant complains that a jury should have been further 
instructed that ffin every event" motorists are required to drive 
at such a speed that accidents will be avoided. 
Again, Appellant is citing cases in her Brief which em-
body entirely different factual situations than the facts of the 
case at bar. 
In Dalley v. Midwestern Dairy Products, 80 Ut. 331, 
15 P02d 309 (1932) a truck was parked encroaching upon the travel 
portion of the highway, and of course, this Court upheld the doc-
trine that motorists must drive, in the nighttime, at such a speed 
that they can stop or avoid objects on the highway ahead which are 
illuminated by the headlights. 
In O'Brien v0 Alston, 61 Ut. 368, 213 P0 791 (1923), and 
the case cited therein in Appellant's Brief, again was based on 
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his headlights to see the Plaintiff's vehicle*, He had seen her 
taillights when he was practically a mile away. After he moved 
into the inside lane and was then in the process of overtaking 
and intending to pass the Plaintiff, on Plaintiff's left, with no 
obstacles or vehicles ahead, the holdings in the Dalley and O'Brien 
cases simply are inapplicable,, 
We do not have, here, a case where the Defendant failed to 
see an object, or obstruction in the highway ahead. He, in fact, 
saw everything that was there to be seen, excepting the presence 
of the horses on the shoulder of the road, but even had he seen 
the horses, standing on the shoulder of the road, and not obstruct-
ing either lane of travel, as testified to by the Highway Patrol 
officer, he would have been justified in continuing on, as he did. 
There is nothing in the law that requires a passing motor-
ist to stop "on a dimef!, when the driver of the car being passed 
suddenly and unexpectedly swerves into his lane at a time when it 
is impossible for the passing motorist to stop, swerve, or other-
wise avoid an accident0 
POINT THREE 
THE JURY VERDICT, CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT FAVORABLE 
TO THE DEFENDANT, SHOULD BE AFFIRMED, 
This Honorable Court, in a myriad of cases, has repeatedly 
announced that the jury verdict will be upheld where justified by 
the evidence considered in a light most favorable to the prevail-
ing party. For example: 
Utah 1964. Supreme Court was required to view evidence 
in light most favorable to the verdict winner.—Taylor 
v. Johnson, 393 P«2d 382, 15 Utah 2d 343, appeal after 
remand 414 P.2d 575, 18 Utah 2d 16. 
Utah 1964. Evidence and all reasonable inferences that 
could be drawn therefrom were to be VIPWPH in ^ i o-ht- mnst-
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favorable to jury's findings,--Gordon v3 Provo City, 
391 P02d 430, 15 Utah 2d 287. 
When trial court has given approval to deter-
mination by jury by refusing to grant new trial, 
judgment should be looked upon with some degree of 
verity, presumption is in favor of its validity, 
and burden is upon appellant to show some persuasive 
reason for upsetting it.--Id, 
Utah 1963, Facts must be viewed in light most favor-
able to party who prevails below.--Ortega v. Thomas, 
383 P.2d 406, 14 Utah 2d 296. 
Utah 1963. On appeal of defendant, evidence must be 
viewed in light most favorable to plaintiff*—Powers 
v, Taylor, 379 P.2d 380, 14 Utah 2d 152. 
The investigating officer, who was also an eye-witness, 
testified directly contrary to the testimony of the Plaintiff. 
He also substantiated the version of the accident testified to by 
the Defendant, 
The Plaintiff's version that the horses were walking on 
the travel portion of the highway was refuted by both the officer 
and the Defendant. The Plaintiff's statement that she signaled 
before changing lanes was refuted both by the Defendant and the 
investigating officer. In addition, the Plaintiff admitted she 
had never seen the lights of the Defendant's vehicle before she 
changed lanes, but quite surprisingly, saw the lights immediately 
before the impact. She never looked in her outside rear-view 
mirror before making the lane changea 
Indeed the evidence of the Plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence was, in fact, overwhelming, and the verdict of the jury 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L9 E0 MIDGLEY 
^1L Fact- 9nH Snut-h #906 
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